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INTRODUCTION

“[T]here are only ‘two categories’ of companies affected by trade secret theft
— ‘[T]hose [sic] that know they’ve been compromised and those that don’t know
yet.’”1 Whether you imagine a cyber thief subverting a company’s network
defenses or an employee selling secret information to a competitor, trade secret
theft is a real threat. The epidemic has ballooned to such proportions- $600
billion –that combatting trade secret theft enjoys bipartisan congressional
support.2 Despite Congress’s best efforts, there is no evidence the bleeding has
slowed, much less stopped. 3
By its very nature, trade secret protection requires a delicate balance, unlike
traditional intellectual property. Within the intellectual property framework,
trade secrets are an enigma. Traditional intellectual property law grants inventors
and artists legal protection for sharing their innovations; however, the
government grants protection to trade secret owners who withhold their
innovations.4
The term “trade secret” likely brings to mind something like Coca-Cola’s
secret formula; however, the law extends protection to less-obvious examples,
such as a list of customer names or employee know-how.5
If you accept Attorney General Holder’s position that every company has
been compromised from trade secret theft, then Coca-Cola deserves a “shoutout.” Hundreds of years after the popular syrup was invented, the secret formula
remains a secret. The lengths Coca-Cola has gone to protect the formula is
legendary.6 For example, the company retreated from India to avoid disclosing
the formula to the government.7 Coca-Cola defied a court order requiring them
to produce the formula during a lawsuit between the company and its bottlers.8
Coca-Cola illustrates the true value of its secret formula through its extraordinary
efforts to protect it. Instead of relying on a legal safety net, the company itself
guards its most precious treasure.

1 Eric H. Holder, Jr., U.S. Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Address at the Administration
Trade Secret Strategy Rollout (Feb. 20, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorneygeneral-eric-holder-speaks-administration-trade-secret-strategy-rollout.
2 COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF A M. INTELL. PROP., UPDATE TO THE IP COMMISSION
REPORT 1, 3 (2017).
3 Id.
4 18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3).
5 Id.
6 Reuters, Dispute over Coca-Cola’s Secret Formula, N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 1993),
https://www.nytimes.com/1993/05/03/business/dispute-over-coca-cola-s-secretformula.html.
7 Id.
8 Associated Press, Coca-Cola Refuses to Reveal Formulas, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 11, 1985, 12:00
AM), https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-09-11-fi-7372-story.html.
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Not all companies are as successful as Coca-Cola. In 2016, thieves siphoned
an estimated $600 billion worth of trade secrets from United States companies;
in response, Congress passed the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA). 9 The
DTSA gives trade secret owners powerful tools to prevent their secrets from
being disclosed and provides a private right of action for trade secret owners in
federal court.10 Despite Congress’s noble intentions, the DTSA fails to protect
America’s trade secrets and actually harms domestic innovation. This Note
argues for the repeal of the DTSA.
Trade secret law attempts to protect unfair competitive advantages by
preventing disclosure of the secret itself; however, companies rarely litigate over
secrets like the Coca-Cola formula.11 Instead, employers predominantly use
trade secret litigation as a means to limit employee mobility and reduce legitimate
competition.12 As a result, trade secret law reduces innovation while also failing
to deter trade secret theft. Trade secret owners themselves, not Congress or the
courts, are in the best position to prevent their secrets from being stolen.
This Note briefly describes trade secret history, as well as the DTSA’s
legislative history and two legislative sources: the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA) and the Economic Espionage Act (EEA). Secondly, this Note describes
DTSA’s major provisions and analyzes how the law is used, and reviews how the
courts interpret the Act. Finally, this Note argues that trade secret law
disproportionately and negatively affects employees and small businesses.
Congress must repeal DTSA, shift its paradigm from preventing trade secret theft,
and focus on actual trade secret theft as an unfair method of competition.
II. BACKGROUND
A. TRADE SECRET HISTORY – AN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENIGMA

Compared to traditional intellectual property law, trade secrets were born an
oddity.13 Although some scholars trace trade secret law to the Roman empire, 14
modern trade secret law emerged from common law roots in Massachusetts

COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 3.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b).
11 See infra Section II(h).
12 See infra Section III(b).
13 For example, the Constitution charges Congress with establishing the patent system, see
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
14 See A. Arthur Schiller, Trade Secrets and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti, 30 COLUM.
L. REV. 837, 838-39 (1930) (describing a cause of action protecting slave owners from thirdparties who attempt to bribe or intimidate slaves into divulging confidential business
information).
9

10
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during the early 19th century.15 Trade secret law evolved from tort and contract
doctrines, where conflicts usually involved a breach of a confidential relationship
between employer and employee, or a trade secret owner and a bad-faith actor.16
The argument that trade secrets do not belong under the intellectual property
“umbrella” at all is a strong one. Intellectual property law encourages public
disclosure of scientific advancements in exchange for legal protection. 17 The
government incentivizes innovation by granting exclusive rights to inventors, for
a limited duration, so the world can build upon the advancements and creativity
of others.18
In contrast, as the name implies, trade secret owners are entitled to legal
redress for not disclosing their innovations. “Indeed, the very assumptions
underlying patent and copyright laws—that government-granted rights can serve
to incentivize the creation and sharing of new ideas and expression—are
diametrically opposed to the notion of keeping information secret to gain a
competitive advantage.”19 A “trade secret owner is rewarded for keeping
information . . . away from the public for an unlimited duration.”20 Despite these
differences, and as this Note highlights, trade secret law plays an important
complementary role to patent law.
B. WHAT IS A TRADE SECRET?

Generally, a trade secret is anything not commonly known by those within
the industry and derives independent economic value;21 however, a trade secret
owner must take reasonable steps to protect the secret before they can assert a
claim for misappropriation. 22 Misappropriation claims require allegations that a
defendant improperly acquired, used, or threatened to acquire or use, the trade
secret.23 Unlike a patent owner, a trade secret owner has no claim against a

15 E.g., Vickery v. Welch, 36 Mass. (19 Pick.) 523, 527 (1837) (granting damages for trade
secret misappropriation); Taylor v. Blanchard, 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 370, 375 (1866) (granting
injunctive relief for threatened misappropriation).
16 See Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. L.
REV. 311, 316-17 (2008) (describing the evolution of trade secret doctrine from a contractual
employment relationship and a series of common law torts: breach of confidence, breach of
confidential relationship, common law misappropriation, unfair competition, unjust
enrichment, and trespass).
17 Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 11
(2007).
18 Id.
19 Id. at 6.
20 Id. at 11.
21 Lemley, supra note 16, at 317.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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defendant who obtained the same secret through independent research, or even
reverse engineering.24
Generally, trade secret issues arise in three contexts: “competitive intelligence,
business transactions, and departing employees.”25 Competitive intelligence
describes attempts to acquire information about a competitor, and courts must
determine if the conduct used was “improper.”26 Usually, improper conduct
invokes an independent legal wrong in the form of trespass, theft, bribery, and
so on.27
Trade secret litigation that stems from a business transaction or a departing
employee typically involves a breach of a pre-existing relationship. 28 Improper
conduct in this context is analogous to a breach of contract, where the trade
secret owner asserts the defendant failed to abide by the terms of their
agreement, implied or otherwise.29
Distilled into its various pieces, trade secret law is merely a patchwork of
various legal doctrines brought together under one umbrella. For this reason,
some scholars label trade secret law as “parasitic” and question the need for trade
secret law altogether.30 Other scholars recognize “the economic benefits that
flow from [trade secret law’s] existence, most notably incentives for businesses
to spend less money protecting secret information . . . [and] as a means for the
public to enforce populist norms about ‘commercial ethics.’”31

24 See Risch, supra note 17, at 12 (“[T]rade secret laws allow for the protection of identical
information if two parties independently discover the information.”); id. n.40 (“[R]everse
engineering is commonly accepted as an exception to improper means . . . .”).
25 Lemley, supra note 16, at 318.
26 Id. at 321.
27 Risch, supra note 17, at 10. The most famous exception to this position is the du Pont
case. See, e.g., E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1970)
(finding trade secret liability when aerial photographs were taken of a chemical plant under
construction. While under construction, plaintiffs asserted the plant layout itself was a trade
secret that was necessarily exposed due to construction. The court held that the flight, and
photographs, did not break any law except for trade secret).
28 Lemley, supra note 16, at 318.
29 Risch, supra note 17, at 10.
30 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of Justification, 86
CAL. L. REV. 241, 245-47 (1998) (“Contrary to popular view, trade secret law is not essential
to the protection of intellectual property; in fact, most of its benefits are better achieved
through contract.”).
31 Risch, supra note 17, at 5-6.
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C. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION V. PATENT PROTECTION

Given the choice, companies balance several considerations when deciding
between trade secret protection and patent protection. 32 For example, a trade
secret owner’s “right to sue is triggered only when the secret is wrongfully used
or taken.”33 A patent owner enjoys a government-granted monopoly.34 At the
same time, patents are costly to acquire35 and even more to protect;36 whereas,
the costs imposed on trade secret owners are theoretically proportional to the
value of the secret itself.
“Judges and lawyers have sometimes reasoned that because trade secret law
provides less protection to the inventor than patent law does, no rational person
who makes a patentable invention would fail to seek a patent . . . . That reasoning
is unsound.”37 Trade secret and patent law counter-balance each other in cost
and duration. For example, the “disclosure required by patent law may enable a
competitor to invent around the patent in less time than it would take him to
discover the inventor’s secret.”38 More salient, if a patent owner sued for
infringement, “patent litigation [is] very costly . . . [and] a patentee puts his patent
at risk of being held invalid;”39 thus, the patentee endures the sunk cost of
obtaining the patent to begin with. “One way to avoid infringement is not to

32 This is true where businesses have the option to choose between patent or trade secret
protection. Patent protection is limited to a “process, machine, manufacture, or composition
of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). Trade secret protection covers a wider swath of
information. Thus, businesses only confront this choice when patentability overlaps with
trade secret protection.
33 Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Problematic Role of Criminal Law in Regulating Use of Information:
The Case of the Economic Espionage Act, 80 N.C. L. REV. 853, 867-68 (2002).
34 35 U.S.C.A. § 154.
35 See Stephen Key, Don’t File that Patent Yet. File A Provisional Patent Application First.,
FORBES (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.forbes.com/sites/stephenkey/2018/01/08/dont-filethat-patent-yet-file-a-provisional-patent-application-first/#6f3cc7cb57fe (noting that patent
applications can “easily cost $15,000-$35,000); see also Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent
in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/thecost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/ (depending on the complexity of the
invention, “attorneys’ fees through filing can certainly go well above $15,000”).
36 Malathi Nayak, Cost of Patent Infringement Litigation Falling Sharply, BIG L. BUS. (Aug. 11,
2017),
https://biglawbusiness.com/cost-of-patent-infringement-litigation-falling-sharply
(noting that the median cost for cases “with $1 million to $10 million at stake declined 47
percent from 2015 to $1.7 million in 2017, according to the American Intellectual Property
Law Association’s ‘2017 Report of the Economic Survey’ obtained by Bloomberg BNA. . . .
In cases with below $1 million at stake, the median cost fell . . . to $800,000 in 2017. . . .”).
37 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC S TRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 356 (Harv. Univ. Press ed. 2003).
38 Id. at 357.
39 Id.
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patent.”40 Continuing on the theme of patent costs, an inventor may believe
their invention is only of modest value and not worth the time and fees a patent
requires. In that instance, trade secret protection is an enticing alternative where
the cost of protecting the secret would be proportional to its modest value.41
Trade secret protection fills gaps created by the patent scheme. For example,
obtaining a twenty-year monopoly for an invention that technology is likely to
outpace in five years is sub-optimal. Considered together, trade secret law and
patent law “reflect the fact that patent law cannot be tailored finely enough to
cover every [invention].”42
As this Note will show, the Defend Trade Secrets Act significantly increased
trade secret liability, which may push businesses away from the patent process. 43
Initially, this appears to be a boon for small businesses and startups who may be
deterred by patent costs; however, trade secret law is more damaging to smaller
firms because of its implications for employee mobility.44 Because businesses
use trade secret law primarily to control employee know-how and limit mobility,
the law actively reduces innovation.45
D. EVOLUTION OF THE DEFEND TRADE SECRETS ACT

Although born from the common law,46 modern trade secret law was
predominantly codified by state legislation, until Congress passed the DTSA. 47
The majority of states have adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, in various
forms, as the basis for their trade secret law.48 At the federal level before DTSA,
the Attorney General was solely responsible for protecting American trade
secrets from economic espionage.49 The escalating instances of trade secret
theft, and the perception that state-level trade secret law is inadequate to mitigate
the threat, led Congress to pass DTSA in order to protect America’s competitive
advantage–innovation.50 “Trade secrets are an integral part of a company’s
competitive advantage in today’s economy, and with the increased digitization of

Id.
Id.
42 Id. at 359.
43 See infra, Section II(c).
44 See infra, Section III(b).
45 Id.
46 See Lemley, supra note 16 and accompanying text.
47 John Cannan, A (Mostly) Legislative History of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, 109 L.
LIBR. J. 363, 368 (2017).
48 Id.
49 Economic Espionage Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1836(a) (1996).
50 Cannan, supra note 47, at 365-366.
40
41
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critical data and increased global trade, this information is highly susceptible to
theft.”51
The Defend Trade Secrets Act amends the Economic Espionage Act (EEA),
but it also draws substantially from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA) that
most states have implemented in some form.52 Thus, one cannot fully
understand the DTSA without understanding its two primary sources.
1. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA)
The Uniform Trade Secrets Act is the result of ten years of research and labor
from the Uniform Law Commission. 53 In response to uneven development of
state trade secret law, as well as the inherent conflict between the goal of trade
secrets (to prevent the distribution of innovation) and the goal of patent law (to
encourage the distribution of innovation), the Special Committee on the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act formed on February 17, 1968.54 The Special
Committee sought to establish a compromise between patents and trade secrets,
as well as define the precise contours of trade secret law that litigants and courts
could effectively rely upon.55 The Special Committee concluded its work in 1979,
when the Uniform Law Commission recommended UTSA for enactment.56
UTSA would undergo minor clarifying amendments in 1985, but has otherwise
remained intact.57 As of this writing, Puerto Rico, Virgin Islands, District of
Columbia, and forty-eight states have adopted the UTSA—most recently,
Massachusetts in 2018.58 Although UTSA has been widely adopted, not every
state adopted the statute in its entirety, and not every state court has interpreted
its provisions in the same way.59 This variability affects multi-state companies
most, since state law provided the only private right of action for trade secret
theft until the Defend Trade Secrets Act passed in 2016.60

H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 3 (2016).
Cannan, supra note 47, at 368.
53 Id.
54 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT commission’s prefatory note to 1985 amendments (UNIF. L.
COMM’N 1985), https://www.uniformlaws.org (search in search bar for “Trade Secrets Act”;
then choose “Trade Secrets Act” hyperlink; then click “Documents” tab; then click “Final Act,
with comments” hyperlink).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 See
Trade
Secrets
Act,
UNIF.
L.
COMM’N,
https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?communitykey=3a2538fbe030-4e2d-a9e2-90373dc05792&tab=groupdetails (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
59 See Cannan, supra note 47, at 368.
60 Id. at 365-66.
51
52
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2. The Economic Espionage Act
By 1996, foreign and domestic trade secret theft incidents was on the rise. 61
Notable at this time, Congress considered foreign intellectual property theft a
national security concern that had no meaningful remedy at law. 62 Congress
responded to this threat with the Economic Espionage Act, a criminal statute
intended to arm prosecutors with the legal weapons necessary to protect U.S.
interests.63 While deliberating, Congress actually considered adding a private
cause of action to the original EEA, but some legislators expressed concern
combining private civil remedies into a criminal bill.64 Congress intended to
revisit this idea later in the term,65 but it would be twenty years before Congress
fulfilled its intention.
[The Economic Espionage Act] will help us crack down on acts
like software piracy and copyright infringement that cost
American businesses billions of dollars in lost revenues . . . [and]
makes the theft of misappropriation of trade secrets a Federal
crime. . . . [The EEA also] strengthens protection for our
national information infrastructure by eliminating gaps in the
criminal laws covering attacks against computers and the
information they contain. . . . This Act will protect the trade
secrets of all businesses operating in the United States . . . from
economic espionage and trade secret theft . . . .66
Despite these lofty expectations, the EEA produced only 125 indictments
and ten convictions.67 Meanwhile, in 2012, the Director of the National Security
Agency, General Keith Alexander, declared the loss of “industrial information
and intellectual property through cyber espionage . . . the ‘greatest transfer of
wealth in history’”.68 In 2013, an independent and bipartisan commission
estimated United States businesses lost over $300 billion annually from

61 Robin L. Kuntz, Note, How Not to Catch a Thief: Why the Economic Espionage Act Fails to
Protect American Trade Secrets, 28 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 901, 903 (2013).
62 Id. at 904.
63 Id. at 904-05.
64 Cannan, supra note 47, at 369.
65 Id.
66 William J. Clinton, U.S. President, Remarks upon Signing of the Economic Espionage
Act, Pub. L. No. 104-294 (Oct. 11, 1996), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD1996-10-14/pdf/WCPD-1996-10-14-Pg2040-2.pdf.
67 Joseph Brees, Trade Secrets Go Federal – Parade to Follow, 12 J. OF BUS. & TECH. L. 277, 282
(2017).
68 Josh Rogin, NSA Chief: Cybercrime Constitutes the “Greatest Transfer of Wealth in History”,
FOREIGN POL’Y (July 9, 2012), https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/07/09/nsa-chiefcybercrime-constitutes-the-greatest-transfer-of-wealth-in-history/.
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intellectual property theft.69 Four years later, the same commission estimated
that the value of trade secret theft could be as high as $600 billion. 70 The EEA
failed to deter, punish, or even slow industrial espionage, and Congress noticed.
3. Congress Takes Action: The Defend Trade Secrets Act
DTSA’s origins stretch back to 2012, when Senators Orrin Hatch and
Christopher Coons led the initial reform effort.71 That bill eventually died,72 but
the House resurrected the effort in 2014, which became the basis for DTSA in
the Senate.73 Since 2012, only 1% to 3% of proposed legislation has been enacted
into law.74 The Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA) not only survived the
congressional grind, but also did so relatively quickly for major legislation.75
Buoyed by bipartisan support 76 and a $1.25 million lobbying effort from private
industries,77 DTSA became law on May 11, 2016, 287 days after its introduction
in the Senate.78
Congress criticized America’s inadequate trade secret protections as
justification for the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Despite economic espionage
being a “top priority for Federal law enforcement,” limited resources in the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and Department of Justice (DOJ)
prohibited effective enforcement of the Economic Espionage Act. 79
Additionally, Congress sympathized with trade secret owners who relied on state
courts to respond to multi-national trade secret theft.80 In particular, stateCOMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., THE IP COMMISSION REPORT 2 (2013).
COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 1.
71 Cannan, supra note 47, at 366.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 367.
74 Statistics
and
Historical
Comparison,
GOVTRACK,
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/statistics (last visited Nov. 1, 2020).
75 See Cannan, supra note 47, at 363.
76 Brittany S. Bruns, Note, Criticism of the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016: Failure to Preempt,
32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 469 n.3 (2017) (noting that DTSA received 410 “ayes”, 2 “nays”, and
21 no-votes in the House, and DTSA received 87 “ayes”, 0 “nays”, and 13 no-votes in the
Senate).
77 Sharon K. Sandeen & Christopher B. Seaman, Toward a Federal Jurisprudence of Trade Secret
Law, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 829, 855 (2017). Most of this lobbying came from large private
companies, such as Microsoft and Boeing; however, small business reportedly accounts for
60% to 80% of American jobs; see Kaylee Beauchamp, Note, The Failures of Federalizing Trade
Secrets: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016 Should Preempt State Law, 86 MISS. L.J. 1031, 106869 (2017).
78 See
S.1890
- Defend Trade Secrets Act of
2016,
U.S.
CONGRESS,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1890/allactions?q=%7B%22search%22%3A%5B%22defend+trade+secrets+act%22%5D%7D&r=
1&overview=closed#tabs (last visited Nov. 2, 2020).
79 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016); H.R. REP. No. 114-529, at 4 (2016).
80 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 4.
69
70
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implemented UTSA variations, although relatively minor, nonetheless led to
different judicial interpretations that were case-dispositive.81
“Protecting trade secrets has become increasingly difficult given everevolving technological advancements.
Thieves are using increasingly
sophisticated methods to steal trade secrets and the growing use of technology
and cyberspace has made trade secret theft detection particularly difficult.”82
Congress intends to give trade secret owners “redress in Federal court, just as
owners of other forms of intellectual property . . . can seek remedies in Federal
court for violations of their rights. . . . This narrowly drawn legislation will provide
a single, national standard for trade secret misappropriation with clear rules and
predictability for everyone involved.”83 Just like the EEA, the DTSA faces lofty
goals.
E. DTSA PROVISIONS

Before assessing DTSA’s performance against Congress’s objectives, it is
imperative to understand the statute’s provisions. The following sections walk
through DTSA’s major provisions and Congress’s stated intentions behind them.
1. Unifying Trade Secret Definitions
Before its passage, legal scholars criticized the draft versions of the DTSA for
not aligning statutory definitions with the UTSA. Scholars argued these
differences would undermine Congress’s intent to “harmonize” the trade secret
laws.84 Perhaps in response to this criticism, Congress amended DTSA’s
definitions so they mirror the UTSA. The DTSA defines a “trade secret” as:
All forms and types of financial, business, scientific, technical,
economic, or engineering information, including patterns, plans,
compilations, program devices, formulas, designs, prototypes,
methods, techniques, processes, procedures, programs, or codes,
whether tangible or intangible, and whether or how stored,
compiled or memorialized physically, electronically, graphically,
photographically, or in writing if:

81 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2-3. See, e.g., Katch, LLC v. Sweetser, 143 F. Supp. 3d 854, 865
(D. Minn. 2015) (determining whether Minnesota or California law applied would be
dispositive since the case involved a claim applying the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,” which
California does not recognize).
82 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 2.
83 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 2, 6 (emphasis added).
84 See Christopher B. Seaman, The Case Against Federalizing Trade Secrecy, 101 VA. L. REV.
317, 361-62 (2015).
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(a) the owner thereof has taken reasonable measures to keep such
information secret; and
(b) the information derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being
readily ascertainable through proper means by, another person
who can obtain economic value from the disclosure or use of the
information.85
Simply put, the DTSA makes clear that “nearly any type of information can
qualify as a trade secret, as long as the owner took reasonable steps to keep it a
secret and the information derives economic value from its secrecy.”86 This
definition closely aligns with the UTSA. The EEA “trade secret” definition
required the secret to be not readily ascertainable through proper means by “the
public”; this variation from the UTSA caused some courts to apply meaningful
distinction to this difference.87 In the DTSA, Congress clarified that it “does not
intend for the definition of a trade secret to be meaningfully different from the
scope of that definition as understood by courts in States that have adopted the
UTSA.”88 The DTSA also included language explicitly declaring reverse
engineering and independent derivation as proper means of acquiring a trade
secret.89
2. DTSA Statute of Limitations
Both the DTSA and the UTSA have a three-year statute of limitations
period.90 Congress did this despite “a number of States” enacting different
limitations periods than the UTSA.91 Additionally, DTSA’s three-year
limitations period is a reduction from the five-year limitations period afforded
by the EEA.92 Congress also significantly increased the criminal penalties for
trade secret theft in the DTSA amendment.93 Given that Congress admitted
limited resources prohibited the Department of Justice from enforcing one of its

18 U.S.C.A. § 1839(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
Joseph D. Mornin, What You Need to Know About the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 28 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 20, 21 (2016).
87 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 208.
88 Id.
89 See Cannan, supra note 47, at 369-70.
90 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 207.
91 Id. See also Bruns, supra note 76, at 487-88 (identifying states with different limitation
periods: Alabama (two years); Maine, Nebraska, Ohio (four years); Georgia, Illinois, Missouri
(five years); Vermont (six years)).
92 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 207.
93 See Cannan, supra note 47, at 379-80.
85
86

https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/jipl/vol28/iss1/9

14

Miller: Repeal the Defend Trade Secret Act: Why Congress Can't Rely on Tr
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

2020]

1/12/2021 6:11 AM

REPEAL THE DEFEND TRADE SECRET ACT

227

“top priorit[ies],” 94 reducing the statute of limitations period while increasing
criminal penalties is a curious decision. Combined, these factors encourage more
collaboration between the government and trade secret owners. Congress clearly
expects private actions will lead, not supplement, public enforcement. This is a
good strategy so long as the private business interest aligns with the government.
3. DTSA’s Private Right of Action
The most dramatic amendment provides the first federal private right of
action for trade secret owners. “An owner of a trade secret that is
misappropriated may bring a civil action under this subsection if the trade secret
is related to a product or service used in, or intended for use in, interstate or
foreign commerce.”95 This provision replaced language in the EEA that gave
the Attorney General exclusive access to federal courts.96
Perhaps the most impactful DTSA provision though, is actually a hold-over
from the EEA. “[T]his chapter shall not be construed to preempt or displace
any other remedies, whether civil or criminal, provided by United States Federal,
State, commonwealth, possession, or territory law for the misappropriation of a
trade secret . . . .”97 No preemption means trade secret owners have the option
to pursue either a state action, federal action, or both simultaneously.98
4. DTSA Civil Remedies
DTSA gives trade secret owners two civil remedies: injunctive relief and
monetary damages.99 Congress carefully crafted the injunctive language over
concerns about DTSA’s impact on employee mobility.100 Injunctive relief is
intended to “prevent any actual or threatened misappropriation.”101 Injunctive
relief is commonly raised in the context of an employee leaving for a competing
firm.102 Employers also use injunctive relief proactively through non-compete
agreements that limit an employee’s future options.103 In either situation,
injunctive relief is meant to prevent trade secret disclosure, but at a cost to
employee mobility.
States have varying levels of tolerance for using trade secret law as a method
to limit employee mobility. For example, the “inevitable disclosure doctrine,”

94
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103

H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 198; S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 3 (2016).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1831 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1838 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
Id.
§ 1836(b)(3) (Westlaw).
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 8-9; H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 206-207.
§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(i) (Westlaw).
Lemley, supra note 16, at 318.
See infra, Section III(b).
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made famous in PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, stands as an example of a very employerfriendly application of trade secret law.104 In that case, Pepsi successfully argued
for injunctive relief against a former senior executive who accepted a position
with Pepsi’s competitor, Quaker Oats.105 Pepsi never alleged that their former
employee stole trade secrets, used trade secrets, or otherwise misappropriated
trade secrets as defined by the statute.106 Instead, Pepsi argued their former
employee, even acting in good-faith, would inevitably rely on intimate knowledge
of Pepsi’s marketing, distribution, and pricing strategy in their new position. 107
Interpreting the Illinois Trade Secret Act (ITSA), derived substantially from the
UTSA, the Seventh Circuit agreed with Pepsi and upheld the injunction granted
by the district court against Pepsi’s former employee.108 In stark contrast to
Illinois, California has explicitly rejected the inevitable disclosure doctrine and
even refuses to enforce non-compete agreements.109
Congress, sensitive to these disparate views, sought to dodge this hornet nest
by not preempting state law, and explicitly provided protections for employees
within DTSA’s provisions. Under DTSA, a court may grant an injunction so long
as:
(1) the order does not “prevent a person from entering into an
employment relationship, and that conditions placed on such
employment shall be based on evidence of threatened
misappropriation and not merely on the information the person
knows;”110 or
(2) the injunction otherwise does not “conflict with an applicable
State law prohibiting restraints on the practice of a lawful
profession, trade, or business.”111
Therefore, since DTSA does not preempt state law, and injunctive relief is
granted so long as it does not conflict with state law, Congress intended for these
provisions to “coexist” with local state law.112
DTSA also allows the court, in “exceptional circumstances,” to proscribe a
royalty paid to the trade secret owner whenever an injunction would be

104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112

See PepsiCo, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262 (7th Cir. 1995).
Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1269-70.
Id. at 1270.
Id. at 1271.
See Whyte v. Schlage Lock Co., 101 Cal. App. 4th 1443 (2002).
18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(I) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II).
S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016).
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“inequitable.”113 Royalties are also available in lieu of other monetary damages
measured by the actual loss of the trade secret, including any unjust enrichment
the defendant has realized above the value of that loss.114 Congress though,
prefers “first [to] halt the misappropriator’s use and dissemination” of the secret,
followed by the award of “appropriate damages.” 115 Finally, a trade secret owner
may seek “exemplary damages” worth twice as much as the compensatory
damages awarded “if the trade secret is willfully and maliciously
misappropriated.” 116
5. Deterring Trade Secret Trolls
The DTSA expands trade secret owners’ available forums, and significantly
increases a defendant’s liability. This naturally creates an environment for
“trolls.” Troll is a term used to refer to litigants who bring frivolous claims
hoping to leverage the significant cost of litigation (in time and money) and
extract a valuable settlement.117 Modeled after the UTSA, Congress attempts to
deter trolls with a provision that grants attorney fees whenever a
misappropriation claim is made in bad faith.118
6. Ex Parte Seizures
DTSA’s most innovative provision, if not the most impactful, is the statutory
authority granted to courts for the “seizure of property necessary to prevent the
propagation or dissemination of the trade secret.”119 This provision is based on
the Lanham Act.120 The Lanham Act, which generally governs trademark
protections, uses ex parte seizures primarily for retrieving counterfeit goods. 121
Although innovative, this provision is also controversial in the context of trade
secret law because the government seizes a defendant’s property without
providing advance notice.122 Congress limited ex parte seizure to “extraordinary
circumstances,”123 and its use is subject to numerous requirements. 124 Despite
significantly limiting its use, Congress expected this provision would be an

§ 1836(b)(3)(A)(iii) (Westlaw).
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(B).
115 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9.
116 § 1836(b)(3)(C) (Westlaw).
117 David S. Levine & Sharon K. Sandeen, Here Come the Trade Secret Trolls, 71 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 230, 234 (2015).
118 Id. § 1836(b)(3)(D).
119 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i).
120 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
121 Mornin, supra note 86, at 21.
122 Id. at 21-22.
123 § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw).
124 Id. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(ii).
113
114
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important enforcement tool and required the Federal Judicial Center to publish
a “best practices” report two years after DTSA’s enactment.125
Much like the EEA before it, DTSA is expected to deliver on very lofty goals.
Congress amended the EEA “largely in response to fears of misappropriation of
U.S. trade secrets by foreign actors.”126 DTSA, however, is also supposed to
“harmonize” state law differences by “provid[ing] a single, national standard for
trade secret misappropriation.”127 Immediately after Congress enacted DTSA,
critics offered their predictions on how likely DTSA would achieve its goals. The
next section walks through the major critiques of trade secret law generally, and
then the DTSA specifically.
F. TRADE SECRET LAW CRITICISMS

1. Cyber Espionage
Despite strong bipartisan support in Congress, and “support from the
intellectual property bar, including the Intellectual Property Law Section of the
American Bar Association and the American Intellectual Property Law
Association,”128 DTSA received mixed reactions from the academic legal
community. Law professors lobbied against DTSA’s passage, arguing that its
provisions do not serve the underlying goals of the legislation:129 (a) to create a
federal civil cause of action, (b) establish a uniform and predictable trade secret
law, and (c) promote innovation by protecting American businesses from
misappropriation.130
The legislative history implies Congress intended for the DTSA to combat
cyber espionage from foreign adversaries.131 Cyber espionage is partially
responsible for the “greatest transfer of wealth” in history,132 directly targeting

125 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-153, § 6, 130 Stat. 376, 384 (2016).
The Federal Judicial Center completed the report in June 2017, which is available at:
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2017/DTSA_Best_Practices_FJC_June_2017.pdf.
126 Mornin, supra note 86, at 22.
127 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 14 (2016).
128 Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 77, at 855-56.
129 Id. at 850-851 (arguing that the amendment does not “address the problem of
cyberespionage” and creates the possibility for “abuse of DTSA litigation for anticompetitive
purposes”).
130 Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067.
131 Id.; see also Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117, at 233-34 (quoting Senator Coons’s press
release, “In today’s electronic age, trade secrets can be stolen with a few keystrokes, and
increasingly, they are stolen at the direction of a foreign government or for the benefit of a
foreign competitor. These losses put U.S. jobs at risk and threaten incentives for continued
investment in research and development. Current federal criminal law is insufficient.”).
132 Rogin, supra note 68.
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American trade secrets.133 DTSA critics argue that this legislation does not
address that threat, and any focus on cyber espionage “may be misplaced.”134
There is substantial evidence that supports the notion trade secret law is illsuited, or perhaps misused, as a means to deter or punish cyber espionage.135 A
2010 study from O’Melveny & Myers LLP revealed that 93 percent of state trade
secret cases “involved an insider, either an employee or a business partner. The
percentage was 85 percent in federal cases.”136 In another study, “the Economic
Espionage Act echo[ed] these numbers. [The study] reviewed all 124
prosecutions conducted by the government between the law’s enactment in 1996
and 2012. . . . [In] more than 90 percent of cases, the defendant was an insider,
either an employee or business partner.”137 Even in the midst of growing cyber
theft, the majority of trade secret litigation implicated employees who have access
to the information by virtue of their position within the company.138 In this way,
strengthening trade secret protection only strengthens an employer’s leverage
over employees. This advances policies that limit employee mobility and reduces
marketplace competition while doing little to address cyber misappropriation. 139
2. Trade Secrets Should Not Be Federalized
The legal academic community also criticized Congress’s desire to federalize
trade secrets.140 As mentioned earlier in this Note, trade secret law draws from
other legal areas, such as tort and contracts, which are traditionally state law
issues.141 Federalizing trade secrets may promote uniformity in the law, but it
also limits competition between the states for businesses and labor. 142 Justice
Brandeis famously explained federalism’s benefits as a means for “states to ‘serve
as a laboratory[] and try novel social and economic experiments’ . . . to address
the same issue or problem, ‘from which the best solution may ultimately

133 “Cyber espionage” means “[t]he use of computer networks to gain illicit access to
confidential information, typically that held by a government or other organization.”
Cyberespionage, LEXICO, https://www.lexico.com/en/definition/cyberespionage (last visited
Nov. 1, 2020). Cyber espionage does not have a formal definition in Black’s Law Dictionary,
nor Merriam-Webster.
134 Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067.
135 See generally Zoe Argento, Killing the Golden Goose: The Dangers of Strengthening Domestic
Trade Secret Rights in Response to Cyber-Misappropriation, 16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 172 (2014).
136 Id. at 220-21 (describing a study conducted by O’Melveny & Myers LLP in 2010, where
the firm studied 394 federal trade secret cases between 1950-2008, and 358 state trade secret
cases between 1995-2009).
137 Id. at 221.
138 Id. at 221-22.
139 Id. at 224-28.
140 See Seaman, supra note 84, at 365-69.
141 Id. at 364.
142 Id. at 365.
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emerge.’”143 A federal alternative that primarily impacts employee mobility and
marketplace competition hampers the states’ ability to compete for labor and
business, which this Note addresses in more detail later.
Turning away from trade secret public policy goals, specific criticism of the
Defend Trade Secrets Act provisions generally falls into two buckets: no state
law preemption, and the ex parte provision.
G. DTSA CRITICISM

1. DTSA’s Failure to Preempt State Law
As discussed earlier, Congress intended for the DTSA to “co-exist”
alongside State UTSA laws144 but also “harmonize” the various laws.145 This is
explicit in the DTSA’s language,146 as well as its legislative history.147 DTSA
supporters and critics predicted that the failure to preempt state law would result
in less harmonization, increased internal and litigation costs, uneven application
of the law, and anticompetitive abuses against small businesses.148
Without preemption, DTSA does not “harmonize” the law, but instead
“simply adds another layer of protection over the patchwork of state laws.”149
Although Congress recognized that the minor differences in state laws
sometimes proved to be dispositive,150 Congress merely provided trade secret
owners with more litigation options and simultaneously introduced uncertainty
for potential defendants.151 “Defendants do not get to decide whether they will
be sued under federal or state law.”152 DTSA incentivizes forum shopping, and
shifts “the balance of litigious power toward plaintiffs and away from
defendants.”153 By adding another layer of variability, DTSA makes it more
difficult for potential defendants to understand their scope of liability.154 Adding

143 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting)(quoting New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311
(1932)).
144 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016).
145 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 196 (2016).
146 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
147 H.R. REP. NO. 114-529, at 196 (2016).
148 Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1067-68.
149 Bruns, supra note 76, at 492.
150 Sandeen & Seaman, supra note 77.
151 See Bruns, supra note 76, at 493 (discussing examples where a plaintiff may choose Ohio
state law over the DTSA because Ohio law offers punitive damages three times as much as
the compensatory damages. DTSA allows only twice as much, whereas Alabama limits
punitive damages to the same amount as compensatory damages.).
152 Id. at 494.
153 Id. at 494-496.
154 Id. at 493.
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complexity also increases litigation costs, which critics predicted would chill
“innovation and . . . growth of the American economy.”155
Preemption, presumably, cures these ills.156 Preemption limits a plaintiffs’
incentive for forum shopping and mitigates increased legal costs for businesses
who need to comply with both state and federal legislation.157 However, this
also means the DTSA no longer “coexists” alongside state laws. Instead,
Congress must take an affirmative stance on controversial trade secret issues,
such as the inevitable disclosure doctrine.
2. DTSA Invites Trade Secret Trolls
DTSA critics also predicted the rise of the trade secret “troll.”158 As
mentioned earlier, a troll “intiat[es] lawsuits designed only to extract settlement
payments or massive damage awards from scared defendants. . ..”159 The term
comes from the well-known patent troll.160 Trade secret trolls can “cause the
same drag on innovation and job growth,”161 particularly because “acquiring
trade secret status and initiating trade secret lawsuits – which can include separate
claims involving covenants not to compete, nondisclosure agreements, and labor
mobility – are significantly less expensive and time-consuming than similar
activity in the patent space . . . .”162 In addition to these relatively low barriers to
file suit, the DTSA gives a potential trade secret troll the “extraordinary power
to seize a defendant’s assets prior to judgment,”163 which disproportionately
shifts power to the plaintiff and risks unnecessary harm to “businesses, including
many start-ups . . . wrongfully accused of trade secret misappropriation.” 164
Increased reward for reduced effort invites weak, if not frivolous, claims. Of
course, some scholars believe the trade secret troll threat is overblown based on
fundamental differences between trade secrets and patents. 165
Beauchamp, supra note 77, at 1068.
Id. at 1066-67 (“Yet, if the Act preempted state laws, then it would likely cause both the
proponents and critics of the DTSA to be equally content, and it would lessen the potential
negative effects on trade secret jurisprudence, the efficiency of the courts, and on business
and innovation that may occur . . . .”).
157 Id. at 1069-72; see also Bruns, supra note 76, at 499-500 (arguing that preemption would
decrease choice of law disputes and provide certainty to potential defendants).
158 Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117.
159 Id. at 234.
160 James Pooley, The Myth of the Trade Secret Troll: Why the Defend Trade Secrets Act Improves the
Protection of Commercial Information, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1045, 1061-1062 (2016).
161 Id.
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 235.
165 See generally Pooley, supra note 160; see also Brees, supra note 67, at 279-86 (arguing that
trade secrets require some level of intent, and that ex parte seizure is limited to extraordinary
circumstances: all points that mitigate a trade secret troll’s success).
155
156
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3. Ex Parte Seizure Inappropriate in Trade Secret Context
The ex parte provision allows courts, in extraordinary circumstances, to seize
property from a defendant without notice in order to prevent trade secrets from
being disclosed or used.166 Congress preferred to prevent information disclosure
and hoped this seizure remedy would significantly contribute towards that
goal.167 Rather than a tool to protect property though, some argue the ex parte
provision is a weapon that “legally permits large corporations with sizable
resources to silence less financially robust competitors, mostly in the form of exemployees.”168 By allowing ex parte seizure of a defendant’s property, Congress
arguably allows the court to seize property without proper due process of law.169
As mentioned earlier, trademark owners rely on ex parte seizures recovering
counterfeit goods.170 “[A] court will not even entertain the idea of granting an
ex parte seizure order if allegedly counterfeit goods do not contain a registered
trademark.”171 A registered trademark gives the judge comfort that an
independent examiner assessed the trademark’s protectability.172 There is no
independent examination for trade secrets.173 Independent review and
trademark registration gives the public “constructive notice that they may be
infringing on an individual or entity’s property rights . . . . There is no such
notice in the trade secrets context.”174 Thus, “judges are forced to examine ‘the
existence of a trade secret as a matter of first impression, without any guidance
from an independent government examiner.’”175 The Federal Judicial Center
confirmed the difficulty judges face when confronted with an ex parte request.176

18 U.S.C.A. § 1836(b)(2)(A)(i) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
Id. § 1836(b)(3)(A)(i)(II).
168 Lauren Rayner Davis, Note, Secrecy for the Sake of It: The Defend Trade Secrets Act: A Devolving
Global Market Based on the Legal Protection of Over-Secrecy, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 359, 363 (2017).
169 Id.
170 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016).
171 Davis, supra note 168, at 377.
172 Id.
173 Id.
174 Id. at 378.
175 Id.
176 See Timothy Lau, Trade Secret Seizure Best Practices Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016,
FED. JUD. CTR. vi (June 2017), https://www.fjc.gov/content/323518/dtsa-best-practicesjune-2017 (“Cases involving seizures of trade secrets are inherently challenging. From a
practical point of view . . . the courts generally will not have the luxury of time in handling
these cases. Also, because [ex parte] may be invoked ‘only in extraordinary circumstances,’
individual judges are unlikely to build up experience with these types of cases through repeated
encounters. These factors combine to make these cases difficult to adjudicate.”).
166
167
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Despite these valid differences between trade secrets and trademark protection,
the actual impact of ex parte seizures thus far dampens some of these concerns.177
H. EMPIRICAL DTSA ANALYSIS

Studying trade secret litigation only grants limited insight into DTSA’s
impacts. “Trade secret litigation can be quite expensive . . . median litigation cost
for a trade secret case varied from $400,000 . . . to over $1.6 million.”178 Since a
defendant faces stiff monetary damages in addition to litigation costs, “it is
frequently more cost-effective ‘to settle than to litigate.’”179 Parallel federal and
state trade secret claims exacerbate the incentive to settle.
Trade secret claims present other unique assessment problems. Some
plaintiffs might prefer private alternative dispute resolution methods to avoid
publicly disclosing trade secrets.180 Additionally, arbitration likely siphons a
portion of potential DTSA litigation,181 since employment agreements
commonly contain mandatory arbitration clauses. Since 90% of trade secret
issues are between an employer and an insider, arbitration likely reduces litigation
incidents.
Professors Seaman and Levine completed a comprehensive empirical study
of DTSA litigation reviewing the statute’s first year.182 The study reviewed 486
cases that raised a DTSA claim between May 11, 2016 and May 11, 2017.183 29%
of DTSA claims arose from major technology and corporate hubs (Chicago, San
Francisco, Silicon Valley, Los Angeles, and New York City); however, DTSA
claims were well-distributed across district courts (74% of courts had at least one
DTSA claim).184 The study drew an interesting comparison to a patent case study
from 2016 that found patent litigation concentrated in two district courts—
Eastern District of Texas and Delaware; these patent-heavy districts handled
only 3% of DTSA litigation.185 The study suggested DTSA expanded plaintiff’s

177 David S. Levine & Christopher B. Seaman, The DTSA at One: An Empirical Study of the
First Year of Litigation Under the Defend Trade Secrets Act, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 105, 150
(2018) (studying the first year of DTSA cases after its passage, the authors only found 10 out
of 486 cases (2%) that requested an ex parte motion, and the court granted seizure in only two
of them).
178 Id. at 134.
179 Id. (quoting Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 79 (1993)).
180 Id.
181 Id. at 134.
182 Id. at 150.
183 Id. at 124-25.
184 Id. at 139-40.
185 Id. at 140.

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2021

23

Journal of Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 28, Iss. 1 [2021], Art. 9
DEMO2 (DO NOT DELETE)

236

1/12/2021 6:11 AM

J. INTELL. PROP. L.

[Vol. 28:1

access to federal courts;186 78% of cases asserted supplemental jurisdiction over
state law claims.187 45% of plaintiffs alleged additional federal claims188 and
“nearly all cases with a DTSA claim also asserted one or more related state law
causes of action.”189 Not surprisingly, “the most frequently raised state law claim
was trade secret misappropriation.”190 Notably though, contract-related claims
frequently accompanied a DTSA allegation.191 The frequency of these contract
claims suggests trade secret misappropriation commonly happens in context of
an insider or sharing agreement, either between two firms or between an
employer and employee.
The type of trade secret at-issue confirms this insider context. Plaintiffs
alleged misappropriation of their customer and business information (i.e.
marketing, financials, customer lists, etc.) far more frequently than secret
formulas or software algorithms.192 Although plaintiffs alleged “technical
information” misappropriation fairly frequently (40%),193 the data suggests that
there are far fewer instances of America’s “innovations” being disputed in court.
In fact, the study confirms that historical trade secret litigation trends merely
continued after DTSA. “Approximately two-thirds of all DTSA disputes involve
a current or former employee of the alleged trade secret owner . . . [and] 26%
involve a current or former business partner . . .. Only 10% of DTSA claims (50
cases) involve parties who lack a prior relationship.”194 In fact, “72% of all
DTSA claims” assert the defendant is subject to a non-disclosure agreement
(NDA).195 NDAs are frequently used to create a contractual obligation to
protect confidential information.

Id. at 142 (finding 26% of cases lacked federal jurisdiction but-for the DTSA claim).
Id.
188 Id. at 142-43 (noting the most common federal claims plaintiffs brought with the DTSA
were alleged violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (20%) and the Lanham Act
(15%)).
189 Id. at 143.
190 Id. at 144 (finding 84% of DTSA cases also brought a state law trade secret
misappropriation claim).
191 Id. at 143-44 (breaking down contract-related claims brought in addition to a DTSA
claim: breach of contract (70%); unjust enrichment (22%); breach of fiduciary duty (40%);
breach of implied covenant of good faith (10%)).
192 Id. at 145-46 (noting customer lists and business information were alleged more
frequently (58%) compared to software (22%) or formulas (8%)).
193 Id.
194 Id. at 146.
195 Id. at 148.
186
187
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Only 9% of DTSA cases alleged any form of cyber espionage,196 and even
fewer (6%) alleged misappropriation from a foreign entity. 197 Although
Congress passed the DTSA amidst the “greatest transfer of wealth in history”
from American businesses to foreign entities,198 it seems clear the DTSA is not
used for this purpose.
I.

A SNAPSHOT OF DTSA CASE LAW

At the time of this writing, seven appellate circuits cited the Defend Trade
Secrets Act, but none of the opinions contribute to the statute’s substantive
provisions, and none address how to apply the statute’s provisions when in
conflict with state law.199
District court case law validates the preemption criticism DTSA received.
District courts followed Congress’s intent for the DTSA to co-exist with state
law;200 however, by doing so, the court reduced the DTSA into an amorphous
being that takes a different shape depending on the context of the case at-hand.
The following case demonstrates DTSA’s nebulous nature.
1. In re Patriot National Inc.
In re Patriot is a prime example of how the DTSA fails to harmonize trade
secret law.201 Corporate Claims Management, Inc. (CCMI) provided insurance

196 Id. at 147 (“[T]he vast majority of trade secret misappropriation claims under the DTSA
do not allege hacking . . . most hacking claims involve domestic rather than foreign defendants;
only 4 cases assert that a foreign citizen plotted to steal trade secrets through
cyberespionage.”).
197 Id. at 146-147 (showing that foreign defendants hailed from: China (7 cases); Canada (5);
Singapore (3); France, India, Taiwan (2 each); Colombia, Cayman Islands, Germany, Japan,
Jordan, Mauritius, Sweden, United Kingdom, and Russia (1 each)).
198 Rogin, supra note 68.
199 See, e.g., Par Pharm., Inc. v. QuVa Pharma, Inc., 764 F. App’x 273 (3d Cir. 2019)
(addressing the standard for preliminary injunction; treats DTSA standard the same as New
Jersey’s standard); Fres-co Sys. USA, Inc. v. Hawkins, 690 Fed. Appx. 72 (3d Cir. 2017)
(preliminary injunction standard); Akira Techs., Inc. v. Conceptant, Inc., 773 F. App’x 122
(4th Cir. 2019) (attorney fees); Dunster Live, L.L.C. v. LoneStar Logos Mgmt. Co., 908 F.3d
948 (5th Cir. 2018) (attorney fees); Kondash v. Kia Motors Am., Inc., 767 F. App’x 635 (6th
Cir. 2019) (arguing in the dissent that DTSA should apply over Ohio state law, but notes that
the provisions are essentially the same); CMI Roadbuilding, Inc. v. Iowa Parts, Inc., 920 F.3d
560 (8th Cir. 2019) (statute of limitations); DTC Energy Grp., Inc. v. Hirschfeld, 912 F.3d
1263 (10th Cir. 2018) (preliminary injunction standard); First W. Capital Mgmt. Co. v.
Malamed, 874 F.3d 1136 (10th Cir. 2017) (preliminary injunction standard);
My24HourNews.com, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 791 F. App’x 788 (11th Cir. 2019) (statute of
limitations).
200 S. REP. NO. 114-220, at 9 (2016).
201 In re Patriot Nat’l Inc., 592 B.R. 560 (Bankr. D. Del. 2018).
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claims administration and risk management services for its clients. 202 CCMI
employed Michelle Shaiper as their Chief Operations Officer.203 In her role,
Shaiper was privy to confidential business information.204 CCMI required her to
sign an employment agreement promising “not to engage in any interfering
activities during her employment.”205 In January 2018, Shaiper began working
for a different insurance firm, Brentwood, after tendering her resignation the
month before.206 CCMI filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection on January
30, 2018, and initiated claims for trade secret violations against Shaiper and
Brentwood shortly thereafter.207 CCMI alleged that Shaiper hired several former
CCMI employees and that those employees brought CCMI customers with
them.208 Those customers generated “approximately $3.4 million” in revenue.209
CCMI alleged trade secret misappropriation under three statutes: “the Missouri
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (MUTSA), the Florida Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(FUTSA), and the Defend Trade Secrets Act (DTSA).”210
CCMI alleged misappropriation for seven types of information, which the
court separated into two categories: customer list allegations and non-customer
list allegations.211 Missouri law does not recognize customer lists as trade secrets;
therefore, the court dismissed misappropriation allegations for that category of
information, but maintained the allegations for the others.212 As to the Florida
trade secret allegations, the court determined “[t]he only connection to Florida
law in this case is the [Employee Agreement] signed by Shaiper . . . which states
that Florida law will govern any disputes . . . .”213 The court maintained the
Florida trade secret allegations against Shaiper, but dismissed the allegations
against Shaiper’s new employer because Brentwood was not a party to the
employee agreement.214 Finally, the court addressed the DTSA allegations:
As the DTSA is to conform with state trade secret laws and not
alter specific court decisions, the Court will mirror its rulings
under the MUTSA and FUTSA. Therefore, the claims against

Id. at 569.
Id.
204 Id.
205 Id.
206 Id. at 569-70.
207 Id. at 570.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at 574.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 575 (citing Western Blue Print Co. v. Roberts, 367 S.W.3d 7, 18 (Mo. 2012) as the
authority that Missouri law does not recognize customer lists as protectable trade secrets).
213 Id. at 576-77.
214 Id. at 577.
202
203
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Brentwood survive the motion for the Non-Customer List
Materials (as they did under the MUTSA); and the claims against
Shaiper survive the motion in their entirety (as they did under the
FUTSA).215
The court applied the DTSA differently against different defendants in the same action.
DTSA merely increased the defendant’s liability. DTSA has no shape. What
happens when courts are faced with a standalone DTSA claim? In the end,
defendants are left unsure what liability they face when they leave a company.
The complexity showcased by In re Patriot shows that trade secret litigation
costs will only increase as well. Courts and litigants must remain vigilant about
what standards apply to specific claims. Increased complexity leads to increased
costs and liability; defendants have little incentive to go beyond the motion to
dismiss stage.
J.

PROPOSED DTSA AMENDMENT IN THE SENATE

Senator Kamala Harris proposed an amendment to the Defend Trade Secrets
Act, referred to as the “Deterring Espionage by Foreign Entities through
National Defense Act of 2019” (the DEFEND Act).216 The amendment extends
DTSA’s statute of limitations to five years and grants treble damages for trade
secrets willfully misappropriated. 217 The amendment also seeks to make it easier
to enjoin trade secret misappropriation conduct that occurs outside of the United
States by including the provision “the offense causes substantial economic harm
in the United States.”218 As of now, no amendment addresses DTSA’s primary
criticisms—preemption and ex parte seizure.
III. ANALYSIS
Congress must repeal the Defend Trade Secrets Act. Trade secret law
unsuccessfully attempts to protect the secret itself. The trade secret owner is in

215 Id. (referring to DTSA’s legislative history and citing Source Prod. & Equip. Co. v.
Schehr, No. 16-17528, 2017 WL 3721543, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 29, 2017) (“[E]xisting state law
on trade secrets informs the Court’s application of the DTSA.”)).
216 DEFEND Act, S. 1865, 116th Cong. (2019).
217 Id.
218 Id. (proposed amendment for 18 U.S.C.A. § 1837 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116169), which currently reads: “This chapter also applies to conduct occurring outside the United
States if (1) the offender is a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident alien of the
United States, or an organization under the laws of the United States or a State or political
subdivision thereof; or (2) an act in furtherance of the offense was committed in the United
States.”).
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the best position to prevent their secret from disclosure. Not Congress. Not
the court.
Importantly, this Note does not advocate for abolishing trade secret
protection altogether and does not view patent protection, by itself, as sufficient.
“A more important consideration is that the patent route, because of its cost and
required disclosures, often just is not attractive to an inventor of a patentable
invention, so that to abolish or curtail trade secrecy would undermine incentives
to innovate.”219 Applied correctly, trade secret law and patent law work together
to encourage innovation and provide for appropriate protection.
Instead, this Note argues for a creative alternative where the federal
government focuses on actual trade secret misappropriation, specifically those
actions that harm the competitive marketplace. The DTSA, as used by trade
secret owners and applied by the courts, stifles innovation and competition.
Trade secret owners must accept more responsibility and accountability to
protect their own secrets.
Trade secret disputes generally arise under three situations: “competitive
intelligence, business transactions, and departing employees.”220 As the
subsequent sections show, only competitive intelligence disputes invoke a federal
interest because those claims potentially include actions that unfairly harm
competition and disincentivize innovation.
A. SITUATION ONE: BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS

Business transaction disputes do not invoke a federal interest. In the context
of a joint venture, or other agreement where parties agree to share trade secrets,
the contracting parties are in the best position to assess the impact that would
result from the other party misappropriating their trade secret. A trade secret
owner is in the best position to judge the risk, and reward, of trusting another
party with their trade secret knowledge.
B. SITUATION TWO: DEPARTING EMPLOYEES

1. Non-Compete Agreements
Skilled employees suffer the most from trade secret law. Employers control
former employees through non-compete agreements and injunctive relief. Noncompete agreements preclude an employee from future employment with a
competitor, at least for a certain period of time and usually within a certain
geographic distance from the original employer.221 Both methods— noncompete agreements and injunctive relief —are justified on the grounds that an

219
220
221

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 360.
Lemley, supra note 16, at 318.
Covenant not to compete, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), available at Westlaw.
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employee retains their former employer’s trade secret knowledge and will
presumably use those secrets in their next venture.
Employees’ covenants not to compete with their former
employer for a period of years are an important method of
protecting trade secrets, because it is easier to detect and prove a
violation of such a covenant than it is to discover and prove that
a competitor’s discovery of one’s trade secret is the result of
unlawful appropriation rather than of independent research.222
Although non-compete agreements promote judicial economy, their
enforcement is based entirely on the contract and asks nothing about the secret
that is actually being protected, or whether the secret exists. Non-compete
agreements operate under the guise of protecting an employer’s trade secrets, but
these agreements also restrict employee know-how. Trade secret law authorizes
competitors to reverse engineer inventions as an explicitly proper method of
uncovering a trade secret. How is reverse engineering different from competing
for the labor that produced the product?
One of the benefits of allowing reverse engineering is the second inventor
may use the discovered trade secret in a new innovative way instead of merely
duplicating an existing product.223 “To forbid reverse engineering would inhibit
the development of products that do not even compete with the one that has
been reverse engineered.”224 Why is independent research and reverse
engineering deemed “proper,” but hiring the skilled employees needed to
accomplish this feat forbidden?
There is growing bipartisan support in Congress for eliminating non-compete
agreements.225 Non-compete agreements reduce employee mobility (including
employees who wish to start their own business), stifles competition for skilled
labor, and limits employee leverage negotiating for better conditions or higher
wages.226 “The combination of expanding trade-secret law and the growing use
of employment contracts covering post-employment activity has a huge impact

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 365.
Id.
224 Id.
225 See Freedom to Compete Act, S. 124, 116th Cong. (2019); Workforce Mobility Act, S.
2782, 115th Cong. (2018); Workforce Mobility Act, H.R. 5631, 115th Cong. (2018).
226 Ryan Burke, What You Need to Know About Non-Compete Agreements and How States are
Responding, THE WHITE HOUSE PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (May 5, 2016, 11:16 AM),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2016/05/05/what-you-need-know-aboutnon-compete-agreements-and-how-states-are-responding.
222
223
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on the career trajectories of many workers.”227 Non-compete agreements
disincentivize skilled workers to develop new skills and expand their knowledge
because their post-employment prospects are so limited.228 Studies show that
“managers earn less and they receive incentive compensation less often in states
with non-compete enforcements, all else equal. Other researchers found a similar
effect in states that provide employers stronger controls via trade-secret law.”229
[W]hen employers control not only true trade secrets but also
general employee knowledge and skills, the net effect is it reduces
investment and innovation. [Studies] found that states that allow
employers to enforce noncompete agreements actually invest less
per employee. And economists . . . found that in these states,
venture capital investments generate fewer patents, fewer new
firms, and less job growth. 230
Additionally, not only do employees struggle finding a job after leaving a firm,
but start-up firms struggle hiring talent in states that enforce non-compete
agreements.231
Trade secret law protects actual and potential trade secret misappropriation;232
thus, employers seeking injunctive relief under trade secret law are the functional
equivalent to employers that use non-compete agreements. Congress’s potential
legislation against non-compete agreements is non-sensical considering the way
employers use, and the courts enforce, the Defend Trade Secrets Act. If noncompete agreements are foreclosed, Congress provides employers with federal
court access to seek injunctive relief instead, via the DTSA.233
2. Protecting Competition for Labor and Business
States compete directly with each other for new business and labor. For
example, Kansas City, Kansas, and Kansas City, Missouri bitterly compete
against one another for new business; so much so that Missouri introduced
legislation, at least twice, offering a truce with Kansas to put the fierce
competition to rest.234 Trade secret laws play a role in state competition.
227 James Bessen, How Companies Kill Their Employees’ Job Searches, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 17,
2014) https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/10/how-companies-kill-theiremployees-job-searches/381437/.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232 18 U.S.C.A. § 1832.
233 18 U.S.C.A. § 1836.
234 Missouri Offers Truce to Kansas in Business Incentive Battle, AP NEWS (May 17, 2019),
https://apnews.com/f275b4faf8dd47df893674a96c584bf3.
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“[E]vidence shows that states that enforce noncompete agreements experience
something of a ‘brain drain.’ . . . [I]nventors tend to migrate to states that do not
allow employers to enforce noncompete agreements.”235 Additionally, employee
mobility improves innovation as “illustrated by the phenomenal success of
Silicon Valley,” where California does not enforce non-compete agreements.236
Silicon Valley employees move around more . . . no doubt often
taking some of their previous employers’ trade secrets with them.
The resulting pooling of knowledge may . . . contribute more to
technological progress than the greater internalization of new
technological ideas that a more effective scheme for the
protection trade secrets would contribute. . . .”237
The movement of employee know-how between firms promotes new knowledge
at each stop, and promotes innovation upon existing technologies. More
importantly, employers are incentivized to foster a healthy work environment
with competitive wages, and even encourage employees to seek additional
training, education, or joint ventures that increase employee know-how and
satisfaction. Instead of companies swapping trade secrets themselves, perhaps
joint ventures that intermingle employees are more efficient. “The informal
pooling that comes from the unenforceability of employee covenants not to
compete may be on balance more efficient [than cross-licensing
technologies].”238 Even though this Note primarily argues that non-compete
agreements should be abandoned completely, there is some justification for their
existence. For example, variable state trade secret laws could fuel competition
for new talent and new businesses amongst the states.
C. SITUATION THREE: COMPETITIVE INTELLIGENCE

Congress should also consider its own cost-benefit analysis. “Consider by
way of analogy the distinction in international law between lawful and unlawful
espionage . . . .”239 Lawful espionage is illustrated by a nation, “ferret[ing] out
another nation’s secrets by patient collation of its published statistics and its
newspaper articles.”240 On the other hand, “unlawful [espionage] is illustrated
by bribery . . . , by extortion, by kidnapping . . . in other words, by common law
offenses. In part the legal difference is due to the greater cost of preventing

235
236
237
238
239
240

Bessen, supra note 228.
Id.
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 363.
Id.
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espionage of the first kind.”241 Non-compete agreements, discussed in the
preceding section, do not distinguish between “lawful” or “unlawful” espionage.
Instead, enforcement is based entirely in contract law, which fails to ask pertinent
questions about the actual trade secret that is being protected. Instead, noncompete agreements operate under the assumption that trade secret
misappropriation will happen. This assumption, as well as the failure to inquire
about the secret that is being protected, harms innovation and technological
progress.
Nonetheless, Congress should be concerned with the unlawful tactics used to
gain a competitive advantage, because that inhibits a competitive process and
competitive marketplace. Much like international law that tolerates lawful
espionage, Congress should abandon all issues related to employee mobility and
dedicate its resources only to those unlawful tactics.
1. Trade Secret Law Incentivizes the Wrong Behavior
Trade secret law requires trade secret owners to take reasonable steps to
protect its secret, a shifting standard that is determined based on the value of the
secret and the situation at hand.242 Judge Posner described the significance of
the precautions trade secret owners use to protect their secrets in Rockwell Graphic
Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc.243 “The greater the precautions that [the trade
secret owner] took to maintain the secrecy of [their secret] . . . the higher the
probability that [the alleged thief] obtained [the secret] through a wrongful act;
the owner had taken pains to prevent them from being obtained otherwise.”244
Alternatively, a trade secret “cannot have been worth much if [the owner] did
not think it worthwhile to make serious efforts to keep the information
secret.”245
However, we want trade secret owners to “take some precautions, but not too
many.”246 Precautions are not costless, and “perfect security is not optimum
security. . . . If trade secrets are protected only if their owners take extravagant,
productivity-impairing measures to maintain their secrecy, the incentive to invest
resources in discovering more efficient methods of production will be reduced,
and with it the amount of invention.”247 According to Landes and Posner,
Id.
See Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc. v. DEV Industries, Inc., 925 F. 2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991)
(“But only in an extreme case can what is a ‘reasonable’ precaution be determined on a motion
for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a balancing of costs and benefits that
will vary from case to case and so require estimation and measurement by persons
knowledgeable in the particular field of endeavor.”).
243 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991).
244 Id. at 179.
245 Id.
246 LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 369.
247 Rockwell Graphic Systems, Inc., 925 F.2d at 180.
241
242
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Even without a law against the outright theft of trade secrets . . .
a firm could do a lot to reduce the probability of such thefts . . .
by screening employees . . . [and] installing more effective
security systems. It will do less if the threat of legal sanctions deters the
theft of its trade secrets.248
The DTSA incentivizes trade secret owners to do less to protect their secrets.
As this Note discussed previously, defendants faced increased liability, and
increased costs, from trade secret litigation after the DTSA passed. With
increased costs, defendants are less likely to challenge litigation from trade secret
owners. Because of this, trade secret owners are in good position to secure
injunctive relief without the need to defend the security measures taken to
protect the secret at-issue, or if a legally recognized trade secret even exists.
Trade secret owners enjoy the protection of a safety net that fails to incentivize
them to protect their own secrets.
a. “Break the woks and sink the boats”
Nevertheless, trade secret owners are properly incentivized without a federal
safety net. After crossing a river into enemy territory, a Chinese commander
ordered his troops to set fire to their own boats and woks. The Chinese army
would defeat the enemy, or they would die. There was no other option. Congress
should follow this tactic. Trade secret owners are in the best position to prevent
disclosure of a secret in accordance with the value of the secret. The law needs
to hold trade secret owners accountable for that burden.
Critics may express concerns that employees will not be properly deterred
from stealing their employer’s trade secrets. However, a 1998 Israeli study that
documented how often parents were late picking up their children from day care
provides some evidence that should mitigate those concerns.249 Before the study
began, parents were rarely late picking up their children, and were not fined the
few times they were.250 After some time, researchers began imposing fines for
late pick-ups; at which point, the study noted a dramatic increase in late pickups.251 By placing a monetary value on being late, parents could complete a costbenefit analysis and determine if being late was worth the fine.252 In other words,
before a fine was imposed, parents felt guilty requiring daycare workers to stay
past closing.253 The study showed how a system built on non-monetary

248
249
250
251
252
253

LANDES & POSNER, supra note 37, at 367 (emphasis added).
See generally Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 5-8.
Id.
Id.
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incentives could be more effective than imposing a fine.254 Similarly, employers
can properly incentivize their employees without threatening litigation and
limiting their future employment opportunities. Instead, investing in their
employees can produce the non-monetary incentives similar to those shown in
the Israeli project.
Before the DTSA was passed, an Eli Lilly representative noted that
sometimes departing employees would download Lilly trade secrets before they
left.255 That action should be condemned, but be mindful that the value of those
secrets are unknown, and whether the employee should even have access to
those secrets is unknown. If the goal is to prevent disclosure of secrets in the
first instance, Eli Lilly is in the best position to do that, and that is where the
government should motivate Eli Lilly to strengthen its own internal policies.
Instead of providing a safety net in case an employee might disclose a secret, the
government should focus on instances where Eli Lilly alleges actual
misappropriation, such as the example Eli Lilly provided in their comment to
Congress.256
Sink the boats. Break the woks. Invest in your employees. What likely remains
is intentionally wrongful conduct that the government can comfortably condemn
because it likely harms innovation and competition.
2. Federal Interest Properly Lies in Improper Conduct
“[F]ocusing exclusively on protecting perceived trade secret rights misses the
point that what we really care about is preventing certain behaviors that are
deemed wrongful . . . .”257 The United States seeks to promote innovation and
competition. As discussed previously, competition amongst the states is
promoted by avoiding a federal trade secret law; however, Congress is rightfully
concerned with trade secret theft when it rises to the level of unfair competition.
Although Congress is in a poor position to prevent theft, the government could
punish conduct that results in actual theft, or harms the competitive marketplace.
Congress has battled unfair competitive behavior in the marketplace for over
a century. The Sherman Act, enacted in 1890, bars conspiracies and
combinations that restrain trade, as well as unlawful attempts to monopolize or
maintain a monopoly.258 In 1914, Congress followed up the Sherman Act with
the Clayton Act (generally, precluding stock or company acquisitions that
produce anticompetitive effects),259 and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)

Id.
Cannan, supra note 47, at 366.
256 Id.
257 Levine & Sandeen, supra note 117, at 235.
258 Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as 15 U.S.C. § 1).
259 15 U.S.C.A. § 18 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182) (“No person engaged in
commerce or in any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole
254
255
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Act.260 As its name implies, the FTC Act established the Federal Trade
Commission as an independent agency.261 The FTC Act declares “[u]nfair
methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce” unlawful.262 Furthermore, the FTC Act
empowers the Commission “to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations
. . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”263
Competitive intelligence cases normally involve an independent wrong.264
Competitive intelligence gained from these tactics easily constitutes unfair
methods of competition that align particularly well with the Federal Trade
Commission’s current mission. Both Congress and the Supreme Court empower
the FTC to establish what constitutes unfair competition. As the Supreme Court
noted, Congress “explicitly considered, and rejected, the notion that it reduces
the ambiguity of the phrase ‘unfair methods of competition’. . .. It is impossible
to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is no limit to
human inventiveness in this field.”265
Thus, the Supreme Court grants the FTC considerable discretion “in
measuring a practice against the elusive, but congressionally mandated standard
of fairness.”266 The Supreme Court adopted the factors the FTC considers when
determining if an act is unfair, including “whether it is immoral, unethical,
oppressive, or unscrupulous,” and “whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).”267
Finally, the
Commission’s experience using permanent injunctions and equitable monetary
relief to restore competitive balance is critical in this context.268

or any part of the stock or other share capital . . . of another person engaged also in commerce
or in any activity affecting commerce, where . . . the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.”).
260 STEPHANIE W. KANWIT, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION § 3:2 (2020-2021 ed.).
261 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182). The Department of Justice
(DOJ) enforced the Sherman Act prior to the FTC Act being passed. Today, DOJ continues
to enforce the antitrust laws, but there is no clear delineation in responsibility between the
DOJ and the FTC. Through their history, the agencies have occasionally disagreed on antitrust
enforcement, most recently in 2019. See John D. McKinnon & James V. Grimaldi, Justice
Department and FTC Skirmish Over Antitrust Turf, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/justice-department-ftc-skirmish-over-antitrust-turf11564997402.
262 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
263 Id. § 45(a)(2).
264 See Lemley, supra note 16, at 317-18.
265 F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-40 (1972).
266 Id. at 244.
267 Id. at 244 n.5.
268 It is noteworthy though, that the FTC’s ability to seek equitable monetary relief is
currently under attack, and in an unsettled state. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Credit Bureau Ctr.,
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However, simply giving this mission to the FTC will not save the United
States from trade secret theft. Aside from the persistent concern of scarce
government resources, the Commission is limited to enforcing unfair methods
of competition against foreign nations only when certain criteria are met269 and
lacks expertise combatting espionage or cyber espionage. Industrial espionage
encompasses a diverse range of bad actors that could be domestic or foreign,
private or national. Combatting this diverse threat requires creative applications
of the government’s expertise. Perhaps, the government should consider a joint
venture between the FTC and other government agencies, such as the National
Security Agency who could bring cybersecurity expertise. A government joint
venture can act proactively to train businesses on proper security measures and
publish best practices related to trade secret protection and policies.
Whatever Congress molds as the solution, repealing the Defend Trade Secrets
Act is the first step. The DTSA harms innovation while doing nothing to stem
the $600 billion tide of stolen secrets270 leaving the country. Although
government resources are always a concern, the sheer vastness of this problem
warrants significant investment.
IV. CONCLUSION
Congress must repeal the Defend Trade Secrets Act. The DTSA
unnecessarily adds complexity to trade secret litigation, gives plaintiffs an
overwhelming litigation advantage, and fails to effectively protect trade secrets.
Congress sought to structure the DTSA so that it co-existed alongside state trade
secret law, but by doing so the DTSA merely adds complexity to litigation and
fails to harmonize state law variations. Additionally, amending DTSA to
preempt state law negatively impacts state-level competition for business and
labor.
Neither Congress nor the courts are in the best position to prevent trade
secret disclosure. Trade secret owners bear this burden. Instead, Congress
should focus on actual trade secret misappropriation through unfair competitive
conduct. The majority of trade secret litigation affected business “insiders” and
disputes over customer information or business strategy information. Although
business owners find this information extremely valuable to protect their local
market share, this is hardly the innovative technical information that Congress
believes gives the United States a competitive advantage.
Variations in state laws reflect very different attitudes towards trade secrets
and how best to protect them. At the federal level, Congress has a legitimate
L.L.C., 937 F.3d 764, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2019) (overturning circuit precedent to conclude that
the section 13(B)’s permanent injunction provision does not authorize monetary relief).
269 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(a)(3) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-182).
270 COMM’N ON THE THEFT OF AM. INTELL. PROP., supra note 2, at 1.
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interest in maintaining a fair, competitive marketplace; thus, trade secrets stolen
through cyber theft or other industrial espionage tactics fall within Congress’s
concern. Trade secret law fails to combat these wrongs.
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